We suggest a new dynamic equilibrium approach that features product di¤erentiation and endogenizes market structure at the same time. The model yields clear-cut predictions regarding the e¤ects of small and large exchange rate shocks on the market structure, pass-through and international trade. First, we account for the asymmetric price adjustment process with respect to exchange rate shocks. Secondly, we discuss an array of conditions where short and long-run international monetary neutrality is violated. We present in detail under which conditions imperfect competition is able to generate persistent and volatile real exchange rate deviations. Most predictions survive alternative market con…gurations.
Introduction
For decades Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) theory at the aggregate level and Law of One Price (LOP) at the product speci…c level have been key building blocks of international monetary models. According to the theory the symmetric price adjustment mechanism ensures that the real exchange rates are time invariant with respect to nominal exchange rate shocks. Despite its intuitive appeal, empirical …ndings as regards PPP (and LOP) have been inconclusive. Two controversial …ndings that we would like to address in this paper are as follows: Firstly, there is vast evidence that nominal exchange rate shocks often tend to lead to very persistent if not permanent PPP deviations. 1 Real exchange rates are very volatile and real exchange rate deviations are very persistent (see e.g. Chari et al. (2000) ). Even long time series or panel data applications do not provide su¢ ciently convincing support in favor of PPP. Although current research interprets PPP as a long run attractor evidence in favor is still rather poor. Secondly, nonlinear tests such as of Enders and Dibooglu (2001) taking the French Franc and German DM as reference currencies provide some evidence that there is some asymmetry in the price adjustment process after exchange rate shocks. 2 In response to empirical …ndings of PPP (and LOP) violations pricing to market literature pioneered by Dornbusch (1987) and Krugman (1987) received substantial attention. The pricing to market literature provides various theoretical explanations for incomplete short run symmetric price adjustment with respect to depreciations and appreciations. To name a few, product di¤erentia-tion, currency denomination of exports and imports, size of the market, vertical trade all seem to contribute to short run deviations from the PPP. 3 Dornbusch (1987) for example uses Salop's circular model of spatial competition, among others, to analyze the adjustment of prices to exchange rate changes. This exercise yields some insights into the level of pass-through in di¤erentiated product markets. Yet Dornbusch's discussion does not cover changes in market structure. His analysis essentially focuses on the short-run. In a theoretical long run analysis, Baldwin (1988) was the …rst to point out that foreign …rms, having invested heavily in marketing, R&D and the like to enter a domestic market, may …nd it pro…table not to quit the domestic market even at very low exchange rates. By staying in the market, these …rms anticipate to recover at least part of their sunk investment. Exchange rate shocks can change the structure of the market and the resulting changes in prices and trade volumes may persist even after the exchange rate returns to its previous value. 4 In this paper we develop a model that substantially extends the DornbuschSalop framework to address the failure of the LOP and its international trade implications. We suggest a new dynamic integrated partial equilibrium approach that features product di¤erentiation and endogenizes market structure at the same time. 5 There are two distinct features of our model. First our model can account for an asymmetry in the …rm's price adjustment process with respect to large exchange rate shocks. We are not the …rst to suggest an asymmetric adjustment in prices vis-à-vis exogenous shocks. For instance, Devereux and Siu (2005) show that due to strategic linkages …rms have greater incentive to raise their prices with respect to positive marginal costs shocks than to reduce their prices with respect to negative marginal shocks (in absolute terms). The reason for the result is that …rms treat prices as strategic complements in the face of positive marginal shocks and strategic substitutes in the face of negative shocks. Burstein (2006) , on the other hand, studies a dynamic pricing problem with …xed costs where a pricing plan change is costly due to informational constraints and therefore nominal rigidities arise. He shows that monetary expansions lead price adjustments than monetary contractions. A seller whose price is too low stands to make less pro…t per item sold, and also to sell additional units of output. Both of these e¤ects create incentives for the …rm to raise prices. In contrast, a seller whose price is too high stands to sell fewer units, but make a higher pro…t on each unit sold. The net e¤ect is that …rms are more reluctant to decrease their prices than to increase them. (see also King and Wolman (1999) for a similar reasoning). 6 In this paper we propose very di¤erent pricing dynamics.
Secondly, the integrated approach allows us to discuss an array of conditions where short and long run monetary neutrality within the international context is violated. In other words, the model presents in detail under which conditions imperfect competition is able to generate persistent and volatile real exchange rate deviations. We also show that most of the predictions survive alternative market con…gurations.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. Firstly, small currency shocks which fall within a given range are unlikely to a¤ect the structure of the domestic market. If currency shocks are small …rms price to market as a function of the existing market structure. Within this range, …rms price to market in a 4 This argument was further re…ned and extended by Baldwin and Krugman (1989) and Dixit (1989) . For empirical evidence of the relevance of sunk costs see Roberts and Tybout (1997) . 5 See also a recent paper by Ghironi and Melitz (2005) that focuses on …xed costs, heterogeneous productivity, and endogenous entry into both domestic and export markets in the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework. 6 Hansen and Prescott (2002) based on occasionally binding capacity constraints, Danziger (2002) and Danziger and Kreiner (2003) based on models with high …xed cost of quantity adjustment do similar claims. We are grateful to a referee for raising our attention to this literature.
symmetrically with respect to the sign of the currency shock. However, large and persistent depreciations may induce foreign …rms to leave the market, which underlies the hysteresis result in the literature. Similarly, sizeable appreciations can set o¤ foreign entry into the home market. Secondly, the model predicts asymmetry in the range of no-market-structurechange. The bounds of this range depend on the persistence of shocks, the cost structure and the degree of product heterogeneity. As the persistence of the shock decreases, the foreign brand is willing to accept higher current losses and the devaluation threshold beyond which foreign brands quit the domestic market rises. Conversely, smaller appreciations su¢ ce to trigger entry as the persistence increases. Furthermore, the devaluation threshold rises as the industry ratio of sunk-to …xed costs rises. Moreover, higher levels of product di¤erentiation favor those …rms that are at a competitive disadvantage. This implies that the lower bound of the range drops as di¤erentiation increases. Entry at low exchange rates is simply less pro…table for the entering foreign brand. Similarly, the upper bound rises since higher brand di¤erentiation reduces the size of foreign brand losses at high exchange rates. Comparing the results across industries, this model predicts that larger appreciations are needed to trigger entry in industries characterized by high levels of heterogeneity and large …xed costs.
Thirdly, these structural market changes in turn a¤ect pricing strategies. As the total number of players in the domestic market changes, the demand curves facing the …rms shift and the extent of product di¤erentiation is altered. This causes a …xed-size and across-the-board drop, in the case of an appreciation, or increase, in the case of a depreciation, of all brand prices. In addition, the domestic brands gain or lose market power as their relative market share changes. As a result, the responsiveness of prices to currency shocks is altered. All of this turns out to imply that pass-through is smaller for large depreciations and larger for large appreciations. Interestingly, this asymmetry implies larger, and possibly more persistent, positive than negative PPP deviations of the real exchange rate. However, note that, as the …rm entry requires, in absolute terms, larger appreciations than …rm exit requirement of large depreciation, prices may increase more easily after depreciations than they decrease after appreciations.
Fourthly, a given currency shock has a larger impact on foreign brands facing direct competition from the domestic brand. This is where the spatial competition setup really starts to matter. The extent of product di¤erentiation is the key to understanding the observed di¤erences in price and quantity responses on the part of foreign …rms. The foreign …rms closest to the domestic brands are most likely to quit the market after a devaluation. These foreign brands, being relatively similar to their domestic counterparts, simply experience a larger decline in pro…t margins in response to a devaluation.
Finally, this model clearly shows that strategic pricing behavior as such is not su¢ cient to generate incomplete pass-through. The model predicts invariance of the real exchange rate with regard to 'small' nominal currency shocks if the market structure at home and abroad are fully symmetrical, that is if the domestic and foreign …rms have identical market shares at home and abroad. Pass-through is incomplete if and only if the domestic brands have a smaller market share abroad. Remarkably, if some of the domestic …rms operating abroad do not serve the domestic market, the model predicts that the real exchange rate moves counter to the nominal exchange rate.
As noted above our model is partial equilibrium in nature. We treat exchange rates as exogenous variables. Furthermore, capital markets are absent. These are all, of course, important simplifying assumptions rendering our model somewhat restrictive. While our model is directly relevant to LOP and sector speci…c pricing and trade matters, the PPP discussion requires a general equilibrium approach with stochastic dynamics. We leave dynamic stochastic general equilibrium implications of our model for future research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and main underlying assumptions. Section 3 focuses on a stylized 4-incumbent version of the model. Here we show the di¤erential impact of large and small exchange rate changes on market structure. Section 4 provides some extensions on the stylized model. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Outline of the Model
In his seminal paper Dornbusch (1987) applies the Salop (1979) model to analyze the adjustment of prices in response to exchange rate shocks in heterogeneous product markets. Dornbusch assumes that domestic and foreign brands are located equidistantly and alternatingly on a circle upon entry. Domestic and foreign brands di¤er in that the latter incur the costs of production in foreign currency. The analysis of the nature of price competition in this model yields novel insights into the pricing-to-market phenomenon. However, as such the model cannot deal with the e¤ects of real exchange rate shocks on market structure since entry and exit destroy the symmetry of the model.
To allow for the possibility of market structure changes, Dornbusch's (1987) symmetrical setup is replaced by a clustered structure in which the markets covered by foreign and domestic brands touch at only two locations on the circle. In addition to its intuitive appeal, this asymmetrical setup proves quite tractable in dealing with entry and exit. It has to be noted, however, that this version of the model cannot be solved in general. This is why one needs to specify the number of foreign and domestic brands competing in the domestic market. Naturally, this entails some loss of generality. Below we illustrate that the main results are robust to changes in the number of …rms.
In addition, the number of potential entrants is restricted. We concentrate our attention on entry and exit decisions in international trade. In other words, we do not consider the possibility of foreign direct investment in the presence of exchange rate shocks. Obviously, some foreign trade companies may get involved in domestic production activities rather than to take the stay, entry or exit decisions in their trading activities in the presence of exchange rate changes. For reasons of tractability we will exclude this relevant option. Generally speaking, changes in the exchange rate do not drive the creation of new …rms in most heterogeneous goods industries (for instance, the automobile industry). Instead, exchange rate shocks mostly cause existing brands to enter or exit speci…c markets. It seems natural to assume that the number of potential entrants is …xed and bounded 7 . Furthermore, the market structure changes in response to exchange rate shocks in any given industry are triggered mainly by foreign brands. Accordingly, to focus the analysis on the relevant issues, assume there are no potential domestic entrants. Similarly, exit on the part of domestic incumbents is largely ruled out by the relative cost e¢ ciency of domestic brands. This is discussed in detail below.
When considering the possibility of entry or exit in any given market, agents' exchange rate expectations naturally play a key role. In this model, agents are taken to have perfect foresight. Ideally, the exchange rate and the expectations thereof would be endogenously determined within the model. For reasons of tractability, our model adopts a partial equilibrium approach in the sense that the nominal exchange rate process is fully exogenous. This is a highly restrictive assumption, nevertheless, it serves as a natural benchmark case. It is of course possible to extend the model to capture stochastic dynamics by adding unexpected shocks with the use of, for instance, the [s,S] pricing rules found in state contingent pricing models. (Caplin and Leahy (1991) ). Exchange rate uncertainty may qualitatively alter our results. For reasons of brevity, we leave this to future research.
Having outlined the main assumptions underlying the analysis, this section concludes by introducing the model itself.
Producers
Domestic and foreign …rms incur …xed costs (F D and F F ) when active in the domestic market. These include all recurrent expenses that are locked in for exactly one period such as brand name maintenance advertising and distribution costs (Baldwin, 1988) . Firms have to incur these costs at the start of every period in order to stay in the market. Note that in our model, F does not include the actual costs of production. In fact, all …rms have access to the same constant returns to scale production technology: w D = w F ; where w denotes the marginal cost of production. Foreign brands are at a …xed cost disadvantage relative to the domestic brand 8 :
This assumption will prove to be useful as we analyze the entry and exit decisions of the foreign …rms in the domestic market. 9 In addition, entrants incur a sunk cost S before entering the domestic market. This includes all costs incurred while setting up a distribution network, establishing a brand name, etc. Once an incumbent has left the market, 7 This boundedness assumption re ‡ects the scarcity of certain irreplacable inputs. It is hard to think of industries producing highly di¤erentiated goods that have an unlimited supply of potential entrants. 8 Foreign brands may incur higher …xed costs for a variety of reasons such as higher transportation, distribution and brand maintenance advertising expenditures. 9 In spite of its intuitive nature this assumption may not always be true. Under certain circumstances some foreign …rms may even have …xed maintenance cost advantage as compared to their domestic counter parts (as it may well be in the Central and Eastern European case, where Western companies may have access to better maintenance cost technologies).
or, equivalently, not served the market for one period, re-entry requires spending of the entire sunk cost S again. Both the …xed (F ) and sunk (S) costs are incurred in the domestic market, therefore in domestic currency, since these are not related to the actual production of the commodities. Production costs (w) are incurred in the country of origin, i.e. in foreign currency.
We exogenously impose the location of the …rms in the product space. We assume that producers are located equidistantly on the circle upon entry. Rather than allowing the entrant to choose its location freely, we chose to maintain the equal spacing assumption. This assumption may impose some limitations on the analysis. Firstly, maximum di¤erentiation obtains with quadratic transportation costs in the linear city. As shown in D' Aspremont et al. (1979) with the linear city example with two …rms, the equilibrium has the two …rms locating at the two extremes of the city. 10 For the circular city, Economides (1984) shows that the free entry symmetric equilibrium also obtains in locations and prices in the case of quadratic transportation costs. However, this result may not be general for di¤erent cost structures. Secondly, we assume simultaneity in the entry decisions of the …rms to eliminate strategic aspects of product positioning (see Tirole (1994) ). The analysis becomes more complicated if …rms enter sequentially. Given that …rms enter sequentially, the equilibrium pattern of location will be a function of the …rms'anticipation of future locations in the product space. Furthermore, optimal timing of entry would be another matter of concern. To avoid further complication we choose for simultaneity in the entry decisions of the …rms. Endogenizing the locational choice and allowing for sequential entry in this type of model, while technically demanding, may provide further insights into the e¤ects of exchange rate shocks on market structure.
Naturally, some assumptions need to be made concerning the relative position of new entrants. In our model, a bidding game precedes the actual entry stage. Potential entrants engage in a bidding game with each of the foreign incumbents for the corresponding brand location. In equilibrium, the foreign incumbent bids an amount corresponding to the excess expected pro…ts of this location relative to the location furthest from the domestic incumbent. This makes the entrant exactly indi¤erent between the latter location and the other locations on the circle. The entrant's optimal bid is zero and as a result she simply ends up in the location furthest away from the location of the domestic brand. Note that this situation constitutes the unique Nash equilibrium since the incumbents, not having to incur the sunk entry cost, can always outbid the entrants. As it turns out, foreign incumbents invariably maintain their brand's relative position in terms of proximity to the domestic brand and the entrant is forced to market the brand furthest from the domestic one. Note that this brand is the least pro…table at real exchange rates below PPP. In what follows, the bidding game itself will not be explicitly analyzed any further. We assume that the new entrant ends up in the least pro…table position and its implications will be eloborated throughout the paper. 11 
Consumers
L domestic consumers are distributed uniformly on the circle. These consumers buy the brand closest to their preferred brand l which coincides with their position on the circle. Let c denote the utility cost per unit of distance. Consumers purchase one of the goods o¤ered in the domestic market provided that:
where l i denotes the position of brand i, jl i l j refers to the shortest distance between l i and l and e s denotes the surplus derived from consuming the homogeneous outside good. Regardless of the exchange rate we only consider equilibria in what Salop (1979, p. 143) refers to as the competitive region. The competitive region is "composed of prices in which consumers are attracted who would otherwise purchase some other di¤erentiated brand" (Salop, 1979, p.143 ). Simply put, the brands cover the entire market and engage in direct competition with each other. None of the consumers prefer the outside good 12 .
Four-incumbent Model
To start the analysis, we analyze a particular version of the model that features 4 incumbents, three of which are foreign. Two of the foreign incumbents are situated adjacent to the domestic brand. These …rms compete directly with the domestic brand and the non-adjacent foreign brand. Note that this simple 4-brand example features 3 di¤erent prices: the domestic brand's price, the non-adjacent-and the two adjacent foreign brands' prices. In addition, the maximum number of domestic entrants is …xed at 1, while the maximum number of potential foreign entrants is 4. This setup re ‡ects all of the assumptions introduced in the previous section. The properties of this model will be explored under three di¤erent exchange rate scenarios. This is a two-stage game. Initially the market is served by 4 incumbents. Before the start of the game the entire path of future exchange rates is observed by all players, including all potential entrants. In the …rst stage non-incumbent brands may decide to enter or incumbent brands may decide to leave the market. In the second stage these brands compete in prices. The two-stage game is solved by means of backward induction. Having solved for Bertrand-Nash equilibrium pricing strategies in the second stage, the equilibrium number of brands is derived from the reduced form pro…t functions. able positions in the market place, leaving any newcomer closest to the domestic competition. This assumption would a¤ect the identi…cation of the …rms to exit after large depreciations, however, would not change our qualitative results as regards the asymmetry of the band-ofinaction in Section 3.2.1. Our results critically dependent on the existence of sunk costs and the degree of competition, not only on the relative position of the competitors in the product space. 1 2 In other words, we assume e s is relatively small.
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In the second stage …rms maximize current pro…ts in deriving their optimal pricing strategies. 13 Let E t denote expectations conditional on information at time t. R is the discount rate. First, consider the domestic …rm's objective function :
where p F A t+s denotes the adjacent foreign brand. The domestic brand's demand curve was derived by locating the indi¤erent consumer L on both sides. Similarly, we derive the pro…t function of the adjacent foreign …rm (denoted F A). Let e t+s denote the exchange rate (units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency). Note that these …rms compete with two …rms possibly charging different prices. Market shares are not necessarily equal on both sides. The adjacent foreign …rm's objective function in terms of domestic currency is:
Finally, we turn to the non-adjacent foreign …rm (denoted F N A) facing identical prices on both sides:
Solving for the 3 optimal pricing strategies in period t + s on the part of the incumbents yields:
The derivation of optimal pricing strategies in other market con…gurations is identical and will not be given. Several stylized exchange rate scenarios will be considered.
PPP Symmetric Equilibrium
First, consider the benchmark case in which the exchange rate is expected to remain inde…nitely at its PPP value: E t e t+i = e t+i = 1; i = 1; 2; 3 : Foreign and domestic …rms produce at the same e¤ective marginal cost in all future periods. In this particular case the standard fully symmetric equilibrium obtains in every future period. Domestic and foreign …rms charge identical prices:
where n denotes the number of incumbents. Turning to the …rst stage, it is simple matter to verify that no foreign brands enter or exit provided that:
and
To facilitate the analysis we assume below that the conditions in equation (9) are satis…ed, meaning that no entry or exit occurs when the exchange rate is expected to remain inde…nitely at its PPP level of 1. Note that the latter condition implies that:
In our 4-brand model, this assumption implies that the symmetric equilibrium is sustainable if all players would initially expect the exchange rate to remain at PPP forever 14 and it will prove particularly useful below.
Tau-period PPP Deviation
Second, consider a fully anticipated PPP deviation that lasts for periods, after which the exchange rate reverts to its PPP value forever:
E t e t+i = e 1;t+i = e 1;t ; i = 1; 2; 3 (11) E t e t+i = e 2;t+ +i = e 2; ; i = 1; 2 :
Small shocks are likely to leave the structure of the market unchanged while large anticipated shocks may trigger entry or exit in the …rst stage of the game. This translates into a band of inaction, where neither new entry nor exit of foreign …rms takes place. Whenever exchange rate shocks fall within this range, the market structure is una¤ected by the exchange rate shocks.
The …rst subsection deals at length with the properties of the band of inaction and the e¤ects of shocks within this particular range. The next subsection describes what happens when currency shocks exceed these bounds. In this section we simply assume the home country is relatively small with respect to the rest of the world, which means that ‡uctuations of the domestic currency have no e¤ect on the prices of similar goods marketed abroad. This is equivalent to assuming that domestic …rms are not active in foreign markets. Given this assumption, the real exchange rate behavior is governed by domestic prices and the nominal exchange rate. 15 In Section 4, however, this assumption is dropped.
Asymmetry of Band of Inaction under Small Exchange Rate Shocks
For any value an upper and lower bound can be derived on the size of currency shocks. Whenever currency shocks exceed these bounds, the structure of the market is altered. Let e denote the size of the period PPP deviation ( e = 1 e). To keep the analysis tractable, we introduce some additional notation. Let
where n is any non-negative integer. The conditions in equation (10) imply that x(n) 0 and x(n) 0: Also note that jx(n + 1)j jx(n)j and x(n) x(n + 1): Proposition 1.a: When the size of the period currency shock falls in the interval e 4 ; e 4 ; there is a unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (henceforth SPNE) of the two-stage game without entry and/or exit in the …rst stage. e 4 and e 4 denote the largest PPP deviations persisting for periods without a¤ecting market structure:
under suitable conditions 16 .
Proof: See Appendix.
If the size of the shocks remains within the band of inaction, the two-stage game has a unique SPNE: in the …rst stage there is neither entry nor exit while 1 5 For our purposes, the real exchange rate is de…ned as the average price of the goods sold abroad in domestic currency relative to the average price of goods sold at home. in the second stage the 4 incumbent brands simply apply the pricing strategies in equations (5), (6) and (7).
The foreign adjacent incumbent in the 4-brand market determines the upper bound as this brand is most likely to leave after a depreciation. e 4 is positive, or e 4 > 1, whenever …rms realize positive pro…ts with the exchange rate at PPP 17 . In this case the foreign …rms are willing to accept temporary losses as a result of the depreciation in anticipation of o¤setting future pro…ts. If the exchange rate depreciates beyond the e 4 threshold, the initial 4-brand market structure can no longer be sustained in equilibrium. The lower bound of the range is determined by the potential entrants'strategy. It can be veri…ed that e 4 is negative, e 4 < 1; provided that the no-entry condition in the benchmark symmetric case is satis…ed 18 . Assume all of these conditions hold. The band of inaction is not symmetrical around zero. Three aspects of the model account for this asymmetry. Firstly, potential entrants naturally consider the expected entry pro…ts in a 5-brand market. All things being equal, average pro…ts are lower in a 5-brand market than in a 4-brand market. This tends to increase the size of the appreciation needed to induce entry relative to the size of the depreciation that triggers exit. Secondly, the entrant needs to incur a sunk cost upon entry, which pushes the lower bound down. This sunk cost by its very nature does not directly a¤ect the incumbents'strategy. Consequently, the upper bound does not directly depend on the size of the sunk cost. Finally, the entering brand is by assumption located at the position furthest from the domestic brand, its pro…ts being less sensitive to the exchange rate as a result. 19 On the other hand, the incumbent which considers leaving is located next to the domestic brand making its payo¤ highly sensitive to the exchange rate Obviously, the assumption on the entry location stretches the band of inaction asymmetry result, however this is not a key element to establish the band of inaction asymmetry. Other aspects are su¢ cient for the result.
Next, we discuss the e¤ects of variations in the persistence of shocks, the level of di¤erentiation and the cost structure on the size of the band of inaction. Proof: See Appendix.
The band of inaction shrinks as the persistence of shocks increases. An increase in persistence ( ) unambiguously lowers e 4 and decreases e 4 in 1 7 This is whenever F F denotes the foreign brands'pro…ts in the symmetric equilibrium. 1 8 See the second condition in eq (9) or equivalently The upper bound tends to increase as the level of product di¤erentiation rises. Di¤erentiation e¤ectively protects the foreign brand from …erce price competition at high exchange rates thereby reducing the size of its losses. Conversely, the lower bound drops because entry is not as pro…table at low exchange rates 20 . As it turns out, increases in the size of …xed costs tend to widen and shift the band of inaction.
The direct e¤ect of an increase in F is to lower e 4 and increase e 4 (in absolute value), as can easily be veri…ed. The band of inaction shifts downwards. However, as …xed costs increase, the original number of incumbents most likely cannot not be sustained in the initial equilibrium at PPP as the conditions in equation (10) would be violated. To account for this e¤ect, we explore the change in the bounds while keeping equilibrium PPP pro…ts 21 constant by increasing c accordingly (while L remains …xed). This comparative statics exercise will allow us to compare di¤erent industries with an identical number of incumbents which feature di¤erent degrees of product di¤erentiation and different levels of brand maintenance and distribution costs. The net e¤ect of an increase in F , combined with an o¤setting increase in c, clearly is to decrease the lower bound of the band of inaction. The sign of the e¤ect on the upper bound cannot be determined unambiguously. This suggests that the market structure in industries characterized by both high levels of …xed costs and high levels of product di¤erentiation is less susceptible to appreciations than in other industries. Finally, the e¤ect of the sunk cost itself merits some attention. Naturally, the direct e¤ect of an increase in the size of sunk costs is to increase the required appreciation of the domestic currency needed to induce entry. S does not a¤ect the upper bound directly. However, an increase in S is likely to a¤ect the number of initial entrants which 2 0 " e 4 drops" or " e 4 increases in absolute value" will be used interchangeably below. Recall that we have assumed e 4 < 0. 
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we have assumed to …x at 4 …rms. 22 To eliminate this e¤ect, we keep net expected pro…ts 23 n at PPP constant and explore the e¤ect of a change in the industry's sunk to …xed cost ratio. This represents the long-run e¤ect. Corollary 1.3: Keeping the initial number of incumbents …xed, the upper bound of the band of inaction e 4 " rises as the ratio of sunk to …xed costs increases. The lower bound e 4 is not a¤ected.
Proof:
As is to be expected, the market structure of industries characterized by a high ratio of sunk to …xed costs is less likely to be a¤ected by a depreciation. Once the incumbents have incurred the sunk cost, they are willing to stay in the market even at very low exchange rates. The ratio of sunk to …xed costs has no e¤ect on the minimum size of the appreciation that induces entry. Summarizing, industries featuring higher sunk entry costs have comparatively wider positive sections of the inaction band.
To drive this point home completely, consider the US experience of the 80's in a high sunk entry cost industry. Suppose the initial appreciation of the dollar exceeded the lower bound e 4 , causing exactly one foreign brand to make the required advertising expenditures and join the US market. If the 5 brand equilibrium is viable at PPP, all of the brands remain in the market even after the exchange rate returns to its original value. In fact, a larger or more persistent depreciation than the original appreciation is needed to revert to the initial n-brand equilibrium when the ratio of sunk to …xed costs is high, as e Proof: see Appendix.
Naturally, if the entrant anticipates losses once the exchange rate has returned to its initial value at time t + , he withdraws from the market at that point in time rather than incur losses. A di¤erent lower bound then obtains. Proposition 1.b: When the entrant anticipates losses at t + , the lower bound changes to: 2 2 Violation of this assumption requires the calculation of initial entrants every time which would diverge our focus from our main objective of entry and exit decisions. 2 
Prices and Import Volumes Having described the nature of the band of inaction, the behavior of prices and volumes in response to currency shocks remains to be discussed. As long as the exchange rate change does not exceed these bounds, …rms simply follow the optimal pricing strategies in (5), (6) and (7) while market structure remains unaltered. Using these strategies, simple calculus yields the elasticities of prices and import volumes with respect to exchange rate changes and we derive the following corollaries. : The market share of imports drops below its initial value of 3 quarters in case of a depreciation when e 2 e 4 ; e 4 : The elasticity of the volume of imports w.r.t. the exchange rate in this setup is The relative price of both imported brands (F A and F N A) increases in response to a depreciation. The non-adjacent imported brand raises its price by more than the adjacent imported brand, because it does not face direct competition from the domestic brand. It should be noted that the relative price of brand F A in terms of the domestic brand has an elasticity of 5 12 , whereas the brand F N A has an elasticity of 24 Unlike previous models, this particular model predicts substantial di¤erences in pass-through depending on the market position of the foreign and domestic brands. Clearly, pass-through increases uniformly as the distance separating the foreign from the domestic brand increases. The average price-elasticity (in other words weighted by market share:
) is a useful indicator of overall pass-through in a given industry.
Next, we evaluate the trade volumes. Note that the elasticity of imports declines as the disutility cost per unit of distance increases, or equivalently, as the substitutability of brands decreases. It increases as marginal costs increase, since the exchange rate shocks a¤ect marginal costs. Since the underlying structure of the economy is not a¤ected by small currency shocks, no hysteresis e¤ects obtain. When PPP is restored in period t + (e t+s = 1), all e¤ects of these small devaluations gradually disappear. Hence, we can refer to e 4 ; e 4 as the band of inaction: in this range all exchange rate shocks are market structure neutral and do not a¤ect prices and trade volumes in the long run.
Large Depreciations
Shocks outside of the range trigger structural changes. Note that the no-entry condition in the symmetric equilibrium (see the second condition in equation (9) ) implies that appreciations cannot have any permanent e¤ects when S tends to zero. For S = 0; the entrant simply leaves at t + as the 5-brand equilibrium is not sustainable at PPP: In case of a depreciation, re-entry at + t will be e¤ectively deterred only if the sunk entry cost is relatively large. By contrast, if foreign entry is pro…table at PPP 25 , the market reverts to its original 4-brand equilibrium. If not, the 3-brand equilibrium prevails and the e¤ects of the depreciation become permanent. For S = 0, entry is always pro…table (see the second condition in equation (9) ) and naturally no hysteresis e¤ects obtain.
Remark 1: Large nominal currency shocks have hysteresis e¤ects only if the sunk entry cost is non-zero.
First, we analyze the e¤ects of large depreciations. These cause one or several of the foreign brands to quit serving the domestic market. Recall that entry by an additional domestic …rm is ruled out by the restriction imposed on the number of potential domestic producers. The domestic incumbent always stays irrespective of the foreign brands'strategies: re-entry is a dominant strategy for this …rm, as it anticipates strictly positive pro…ts in every future period. The following propositions describe a number of SPNE in which one or more of the foreign incumbents quit in the …rst stage of the game.
If the size of the depreciation does not exceed a given threshold, the nonadjacent foreign brand stays regardless of the other brands'strategies. In this case the theory allows for accurate predictions about which brand(s) will actually leave. If the size of the depreciation exceeds this bound, multiple equilibria obtain. In some of these the non-adjacent brands leave. 
for
Proposition 2.c:When the size of the period currency depreciation falls in the interval e 4;N A ; e 3 and e 3 > e 4;N A ; exactly one of the foreign brands, but not necessarily the adjacent one, leaves the market in the …rst stage in both of the SPNE of the two-stage game.
Proof: see Appendix.
Prices and Import Volumes This decrease in the number of foreign brands has two distinct e¤ects on prices. Firstly, all brands are subject to a once-o¤ and uniform price increase, the size of which does not vary with the size of the exchange rate change. The increased extent of product di¤erentiation due to the decrease in the total number of brands only a¤ects absolute price levels: all brands charge a uniformly higher price as a result of the decrease in the total number of brands. Consumers therefore end up with a lower surplus. Secondly, and more importantly, the relative number of foreign brands will have decreased. As a result, foreign …rms will face tougher price competition from the domestic brand when the real exchange rate falls below PPP. As a consequence they are prevented from raising their prices by as much when the exchange rate rises 26 . The price elasticities are smaller than the ones in the small devaluation case. The percentage increase in domestic and imported brand's absolute prices may be either larger or smaller than in the 4-brand case, depending on the relative size of these two e¤ects. 2 6 In a 3-brand market the optimal pricing strategies for domestic and foreign brands are:
and (22) and (23) .
The percentage increase in the relative price of imported goods is unambiguously lower in the large devaluation case: ; clearly indicating an overall decrease in pass-through due to the decrease in foreign brand market power.
Next, we turn to trade volumes. Two mutually strengthening e¤ects determine the response of import volumes to the exchange rate change. Firstly, there exists a one-o¤ market structure e¤ect: the drop in the number of foreign …rms causes the market share of imports to drop by a given percentage whenever the currency devaluation exceeds the upper bound ( e 4 ): 27 Secondly, there is the direct e¤ect of the real exchange rate change on import volumes. The latter turns out to be larger than the percentage change in response to small exchange rate changes (this can be veri…ed by returning to Corollary 1.2). This means that the percentage decline in imports is unambiguously larger in response to large exchange rate changes.
Note that large devaluations have a stronger impact on imports than small devaluations because the resulting decrease in the relative number of foreign …rms toughens price competition with the domestic …rm as the non-adjacent foreign …rm becomes an adjacent foreign …rm.
Finally, we examine what happens when the exchange rate returns to its original value. Recall that non-incumbents incur a sunk cost S. Re-entry will only be deterred when this sunk cost is relatively large. Corollary 2.2: When e 2 e 4 ; e 3 the 3-brand market structure is preserved at time t + when PPP is restored in all of the SPNE of the game if and only if
Proof: Consider the expected pro…ts at PPP to derive this condition.
Large temporary exchange rate changes can have lasting e¤ects on prices and trade volumes if entrants incur a su¢ ciently large sunk cost. If so, all brands charge a uniformly higher price (p = c 3 + w) from t + and imports only account for 66% of total sales in the domestic market, as opposed to 75% before the depreciation.
Large Appreciations
Large appreciations cause one or several of the non-incumbent foreign brands to enter the market. In addition, the domestic incumbent may consider leaving its home market if it anticipates high losses as a result of the appreciation. 
where F is adjusted accordingly:
Proof: see derivation of Proposition 2.a. Naturally, if the domestic brand leaves, pass-through is complete since the remaining n foreign brands price according to:
This type of markets imply full import dependence, such as in the case of oil markets. Our suggestion is very much in line with the …ndings of Campa and Goldberg (2005) where they document complete exchange rate pass through in oil import prices in most of the OECD economies. Note also that the domestic brand never leaves, regardless of the size of the appreciation provided that
In order to concentrate on foreign entry and exit, it simply needs to be assumed that this condition holds for all shocks e considered in this last section 28 .
Proposition 3.b: When the size of the period currency appreciation falls in the interval e 5 ; e 4 ; one foreign brand enters the market in the …rst stage of the SPNE of the two-stage game.
Proof: for
If the 5-brand con…guration is not sustainable at PPP 29 , the entering …rm's optimal strategy is to leave at t + : Hence, a new bound obtains:
If the appreciation exceeds e 5 , 2 foreign brands will enter. Recall that the total number of potential foreign brands serving the domestic market was …xed at …ve. No additional entry is feasible. Proposition 3.c:When the size of the period currency appreciation exceeds e 5 ; two foreign brands enter the market in the …rst stage of the SPNE of the two-stage game.
Prices and Import Volumes As before, this change in the number of foreign brands has two distinct e¤ects on prices. Firstly, the total number of brands has increased. The price mark-ups are subject to a once-o¤ and uniform cut, independent of the size of the exchange rate appreciation. Secondly, the relative number of domestic brands has decreased. As a result, foreign …rms will not face as much price competition from the domestic brand. Corollary 3.1: When e 2 e 5 ; e 4 ; all prices are subject to a uniform price decrease. In addition, …rms price to the market and the elasticity of prices w.r.t. changes in the exchange rates are:' D = 8 19 e ; ' F A1 = 16 19 e ; ' F N A = 18 19 e and ' Av = 4 5 e ; where e =
1+
c 5w
: On the other hand, volume of imports increases proportionally higher with large appreciations than with small appreciations. When e 2 e 4 ; e 3 ; the elasticity of the volume of imports w.r.t. the exchange rate is (22) and (23) .Firstly, the across-the-board price cut of all prices amounts to 20%: Secondly, the average price elasticity increases to ; which re ‡ects the foreign brands' relative increase in market share power 30 . As a result, pass-through is clearly larger in response to large appreciations. This result continues to hold more generally. It does not depend on our assumption about the cost structure of domestic and foreign …rms and the resulting tendency of the domestic incumbent not to quit even at relatively low exchange rates. In fact, if the domestic brand leaves in response to an appreciation, pass-through is complete. 2 9 That is if c 6 2 c L F F : 3 0 Note that the relative import price elasticies for the adjacent brands ( 8 19 for the F A brand and 10 19 for the F N A brand)) are slightly higher than the corresponding relative price elasticities in the case of small appreciations ( 5 12 for the F A brand and 6 12 for the F N A brand).
Next, we turn to trade volumes. Two mutually strengthening e¤ects determine the response of import volumes to the exchange rate change. Firstly, there is a one-o¤ market structure e¤ect: the increase in the number of foreign …rms causes the market share of imports to rise by a given percentage whenever the currency appreciation exceeds the lower bound ( e 4 ): 31 Secondly, there is the direct e¤ect of the real exchange rate change on import volumes. Large exchange rate appreciations have proportionately smaller direct e¤ects (about a 30% drop) on imports than small ones, because the resulting increase in the relative number of foreign …rms makes prices more responsive to exchange rate changes when the real exchange rate drops below PPP. The total percentage increase in imports re ‡ects the combined impact of both of the above and cannot be unambiguously determined.
Small and large appreciations have signi…cantly di¤erent e¤ects on prices in this version of the model. Pass-through is larger in response to large appreciations. For given foreign prices, this implies that real exchange rate deviations are larger in response to large negative shocks than in response to large positive shocks. In contrast, the responses to small shocks are symmetrical.
Remark 2: Pass-through is smaller for e > e 4 shocks than for e 2 e 4 ; e 4 : Pass-through is larger for e < e 4 shocks than for e 2 e 4 ; e 4 :
The extent of pass-through increases even further as an additional foreign brand enters. The average price elasticity increases to : In addition, the market structure e¤ect of entry on the part of these two brands increases the volume of imports by about 50%. On the other hand, the volume of imports becomes less responsive to exchange rate changes as a result of the foreign brand's increased market share. . On the other hand, when e e 5 ; the elasticity of the volume of imports with respect to the exchange rate is 
Autocorrelation
To illustrate the more general scope of the above results, we explore the impact of a shock that dies out gradually. The model and all the assumptions introduced in the previous section are maintained unless indicated otherwise. Most importantly, all of the agents again are assumed to have perfect foresight. As before, an upper and lower bound can be derived. Shocks within this band of inaction do not a¤ect market structure. The size of this range depends on the speci…cs of the time series process.
Let us consider an AR(1)-process:
We can write the upper and lower bounds of inaction as:
where n is any non-negative integer. Given this de…nition of x (n) and x (n), all of the above results carry over to this adjusted version of the model. For the sake of brevity, we only mention the 1st proposition again for a 4 …rm set-up.
Proposition 4 When the size of the period currency shock falls in the interval e 4 ; e 4 ; there is a unique SPNE of the two-stage game without entry and/or exit in the …rst stage, where e 4 and e 4 denote the largest PPP deviations persisting for periods without a¤ecting market structure:
assuming the 5-brand-equilibrium is pro…table:
Proof: Analogous to previous derivations.
Baldwin Hypothesis
The same exercise can be carried out for more general time series processes. One could easily introduce a second-order autoregressive process
to describe the hump-shaped time pattern -large rise and subsequent fall -of the US dollar centered around 1985 and, as was done for the AR(1), derive the bounds of the band of inaction. As it turns out, the general predictions of the model are entirely consistent with the US experience in the mid-80's. 32 Consider an initial shock e to the US dollar that falls below the appropriately de…ned lower bound e n ; where n denotes the number of incumbents in the industry: This triggers entry by one or several of the foreign brands. All domestic US prices decrease by a given percentage (depending on the exact number of …rms in the industry) as a result of the decreased mark-up. In addition, the appreciation has a larger direct impact on brand prices because of the increased elasticity of US prices with respect to the dollar (see Corollary 3.2 and Remark 1). As the dollar depreciates back to its original value (e = 1); some of the m foreign entrants remain in the US market and US …rms do not regain all of their lost market shares. In fact, if the n + m-brand symmetric equilibrium is pro…table
F 0 ; none of the entrants leave. As the number of …rms does not change, the depreciation has no mark-up e¤ect on US prices. There is only a direct exchange rate e¤ect. Even if a number of the m entrants leave after the exchange rate has returned to its original value, the mark-up e¤ect would still be smaller than the e¤ect of the appreciation, unless all m left. In addition, as foreign brands leave, average pass-through declines and the direct e¤ect decreases . Hence, the model predicts US prices do not rise by as much during the depreciation as they fell during the appreciation, which is exactly what happened (see Baldwin, 1988 ).
Home and Abroad
So far, in analyzing pass-through, we have maintained the small country assumption which holds that domestic currency shocks were not allowed to a¤ect the foreign prices of the same commodity. This section puts it all together. The foreign market is introduced into the analysis and examines the combined e¤ect of pricing responses at home and abroad on the real exchange rate. Coming back to the US experience of the 80's, the dollar rise and subsequent fall is likely to have a¤ected European and Japanese prices as well in most industries, given the strong presence of US enterprises abroad. Second, the exact numerical results in the previous sections naturally depend on the relative number of domestic vis-à-vis foreign incumbents and the absolute number of brands in the market. 33 This section's numerical examples serve to illustrate the more general scope of the above results.
Firstly, the basic results discussed above are shown to reproduce themselves in slightly di¤erent market settings. Table 1 summarizes the e¤ects of variations in the relative number of foreign versus domestic market players. All of the basic assumptions of the model above continue to hold. Recall that domestic and foreign brands are clustered.
Also, consider the price and import elasticities reported in Table 1 and notice how the price elasticities decline as the relative number of domestic market players increases, while the import volume elasticities increase. The elasticity of import prices tends to unity as the number of foreign …rms increases relative to the number of domestic …rms. 34 Logically, higher levels of pass-through prevail in foreign dominated markets. In fact, it is obvious from Table 1 and 2 that the average price elasticity simply equals the proportion of foreign brands operating in the market (times a constant which increases uniformly with the absolute number of brands). The closest neighboring foreign brands of the domestic brand invariably have lower absolute and relative import price elasticities. As domestic brand concentration increases, import volumes become more responsive to devaluations, while the price-cost margins of foreign brands are subject to a larger drop for a given size of the devaluation. As a result of this, foreign brands leave the market at increasingly lower levels of the exchange rate: the upper bound decreases and the band of inaction shrinks. Note from Table 1 that the range in the 3D-1F setup is about one third of the 1D-3F range. A similar decrease obtains in the 6 brand case. Conversely, the lower bound rises (i.e. decreases in absolute value) as domestic concentration increases. This allows the entering foreign brand to realize larger pro…ts in case of an appreciation as the home brands' prices respond very little to the appreciation. Summarizing, as domestic concentration rises, the band of inaction shrinks and ultimately disappears altogether.
It is easy to verify that the basic results derived in Propositions 1,2 and 3 and the Corollaries continue to hold as the relative number of foreign and domestic brands changes.
Remark 4: The band of inaction shrinks uniformly as domestic concentration increases. It all but disappears as the domestic brands'market share tends to unity.
Next, we drop the small country assumption. First, consider small shocks, i.e. those that fall within the band of inaction. Consider a world consisting of two countries, home and foreign. From Table 1 and 2, it is easy to verify that the real exchange rate is not a¤ected by small nominal shocks if domestic …rms and foreign …rms have identical market shares at home and abroad. If domestic …rms have a higher market share at home than abroad, then pass-through is less than complete and the real exchange rate tracks the nominal exchange rate, albeit less than one-for-one. Finally, pass-through exceeds 100% whenever domestic …rms jointly have a higher market share abroad than at home. Given that intra-industry trade accounts for an increasing portion of the total trade volume, this quali…cation of our previous result is quite important.
Consider for instance the case where 1 domestic and 3 foreign brands compete both at home and abroad. In response to a 'small' 1% depreciation, the average domestic price increases by .75% and the average foreign price decreases by .25%, leaving the real exchange rate unchanged. By contrast, if the domestic …rm is not active abroad, the real exchange depreciates by .25% in response to a 1% nominal depreciation. Finally, in the unlikely case that 2 domestic …rms operate abroad (in a 4-brand market), the real exchange rate appreciates by .25 %.
Remark 5: The real exchange rate is invariant with respect to small nominal shocks if the market structures at home and abroad are fully symmetrical. If the domestic brands have a smaller market share abroad than at home, pass-through is incomplete. The real exchange rate variability increases as the di¤erence between the domestic and foreign market shares increases. If the domestic brands have a larger market share abroad than at home, the real exchange rate moves in the direction counter to the nominal exchange rate.
To conclude, we brie ‡y consider what this implies for relinquishing the national currencies as in the case of EMU. If the volume of intra-industry trade within Europe grows and market structures in di¤erent European countries slowly become more alike as a result of the economic integration process, nominal currency shocks are less likely to have signi…cant e¤ects on the real exchange rate. This means that (ex-post) the cost of giving up the national currencies as a tool to improve competitiveness will be very small. In fact, in the limiting case in which the market structures in di¤erent European countries are completely identical, both the real exchange rate and the current account are invariant with respect to nominal shocks. This would clearly reduce the importance of the exchange rate as a tool of macroeconomic policy. On the other hand, if the process of economic integration favors regional concentration, the opposite result obtains and the loss of monetary autonomy may (ex-post) be quite costly.
Concluding Remarks
This paper focused on the short and long term aspects of nominal exchange rate shocks. We analyzed the e¤ects of nominal currency shocks on prices and market structure in di¤erentiated goods markets served by domestic and foreign brands. Nominal shocks that fall within a given range do not a¤ect market structure and have no hysteresis e¤ects. The bounds of this range are asymmetric. The size of the asymmetry depend on the size and persistence of the nominal exchange rate shock, the nature of product heterogeneity and the relative size of the sunk entry cost. More heterogeneity favors the brands that are at a competitive disadvantage. As a result, it discourages entry of foreign brands at low exchange rates. Similarly, it makes foreign brands less likely to leave at high exchange rates. This implies that the band of inaction widens as the level of product di¤erentiation increases. On the other hand, sunk costs invariably protect the incumbents. If sunk costs are relatively large, foreign incumbents may stay in the market even at low exchange rates. As the ratio of sunk-to …xed costs increases, the upper bound of the band of inaction rises. High sunk cost industries are less susceptible to large depreciations. Finally, this range shrinks as the domestic brands'market share rises. Outside of this range, shocks trigger entry or exit. In this case the industry's pricing and pass-through parameters are permanently altered. Pass-through turns out to grow larger when appreciations fall below the lower bound. It decreases when depreciations exceed the upper bound. Taking foreign prices as given, this asymmetrical response implies large and persistent positive than negative real exchange rate deviations. On the other hand we argue that hysteresis result can obtain if and only if sunk costs are non-zero.
When accounting for the change in foreign prices, strategic pricing behavior as such is not always su¢ cient to generate real exchange rate ‡uctuations. In fact, if foreign and domestic brands have identical market shares in both markets, pass-through is complete and the real exchange rate is invariant with respect to small nominal shocks. More generally, pricing-to-market yields substantial variability of the industry real exchange rate if and only if the domestic brand's foreign market shares fall considerably short of its domestic market shares. This suggests that in industries characterized by substantial interindustry trade, pricing-to-market alone may not su¢ ce as an explanation of observed real exchange rate behavior.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: First, the upper bound on the exchange rate is derived from the objective function of the adjacent foreign brand in equation (3) 
This is equivalent to: 
If the entrant anticipates losses once the exchange rate has returned to its initial value at time t + (i.e. if 
Proof of Corollary 1.1: Consider the e¤ects of an increase in . Taking partial derivatives yields:
which is negative if the conditions in equation (10) hold and if R < 1. Consider the e¤ects of an increase in on the lower bound. Taking partial derivatives yields: we > 0 f or e < 1:
As before, apply the envelope theorem to derive the e¤ect of an increase in c on the non-adjacent brand's expected payo¤: To see the e¤ect of an increase in F verify only that the terms within the square root of equations (13) and (14) 
Calculate the elasticity for e = 1. Proof of Proposition 2.a: Use the objective function of the non-adjacent brand in equation (3) to derive this brand's expected payo¤. 
Given that the non-adjacent brand stays in the …rst stage, at least one of the adjacent foreign brands leaves in the …rst stage of both of the pure strategy SPNE. 
If this payo¤ is strictly positive, one of the foreign adjacent brands stays given that the other brand leaves.
